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Towards practical security of continuous-variable quantum key distribution
Cosmo Lupo
Department of Physics & Astronomy, University of Sheffield, UK
Rigorous mathematical proofs of the security of continuous-variable quantum key distribution
(CV QKD) have been obtained recently. Unfortunately, these security proofs rely on assumptions
that are hardly met in experimental practice. Here I investigate these issues in detail, and discuss
experimentally-friendly workarounds to assess the security of CV QKD. The aim of this paper is to
show that there are hidden and unsolved issues and to indicate possible partial solutions. To provide
a complete and rigorous mathematical security proof is out of the scope of this contribution.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a family of exper-
imental methods that exploit quantum optics to realize
the task of secret key expansion [1–3]. Early works on
QKD were defined within a discrete-variable (DV) ar-
chitecture, where information is encoded in discrete de-
grees of freedom (e.g., polarization, phase delay, etc.)
of a single photon or weak coherent pulse. This re-
quires single-photon detectors at the measurement stage.
Later works introduced continuous-variable (CV) archi-
tectures, where information is encoded in a continuous
way in the quadratures of the electromagnetic field, and
homodyne or heterodyne detection can be utilized at the
measurement stage [4]. The fact that CV QKD utilizes
homodyne or heterodyne detection, which are mature de-
tection techniques routinely deployed in optical commu-
nications, is considered to be the strategic advantage of
CV QKD over DV QKD [2].
Obtaining security proofs for CV QKD protocols is
known to be a particularly challenging task. The diffi-
culties are not conceptual, but technical, and stem from
the fact that the underlying Hilbert space has infinite di-
mensions. The first complete and rigorous security proofs
were obtained by Furrer et al. in Refs. [5, 6] and by Lev-
errier in Refs. [7, 8]. Refs. [5, 6] considered a protocol
where Alice prepares squeezed states and Bob measures
by homodyne detection, and the security proof was ob-
tained by applying entropic uncertainty relations. Refs.
[7, 8] (see also Ref. [9]) considered a protocol where Alice
prepares coherent states whose amplitudes are sampled
from a Gaussian distribution, and Bob measures by het-
erodyne detection [10].
This paper focuses on a protocol with coherent states
in input and heterodyne detection in output. I will dis-
cuss the discrepancies between the mathematical model
used in the security proof of Ref. [7] and the actual ex-
perimental practice. In particular, I will focus on two
main experimental limitations:
1. It is practically impossible for the sender Alice to
sample from a continuous Gaussian distribution. In
any experimental implementation of the protocol
she will sample from a discrete and bounded distri-
bution of coherent state amplitudes.
2. Experimental heterodyne detection differs from the
mathematical model used in the security proofs. In
particular, the range of ideal heterodyne detection
is unbounded, whereas its experimental implemen-
tations have necessarily a finite range.
The reason to focus on these two non-idealities is
two fold: 1) they play a central conceptual role in the
proof strategy of Refs. [7, 8]; 2) they represent a serious
challenges to experimental demonstrations of secure CV
QKD.
The first issue about state preparation was addressed
by Jouguet et al. in Ref. [11]. Here I show that their
approach is not experimentally feasible. More recently,
this issue has been addressed by Kaur, Guha, and Wilde
in Ref. [12], who provided a solution that depends on
three free parameters that cannot be estimated from ex-
perimental data. The approach I develop here, which is
conceptually similar, reduces the number of free parame-
ters from three to two. Furthermore, I present a physical
argument that may allow us to get rid of the remaining
two free parameters. To the best of my knowledge, the
second issue about non-ideal heterodyne detection has
never been explicitly addressed in literature.
The aim of this work is not to present a complete and
rigorous mathematical security proof, but to spell out
the limitations of known security proofs and suggest an
approach that may, in some part, solve them. In partic-
ular, I do not discuss parameter estimation here. This
will allow me to focus on the two physical issues out-
lined above. Parameter estimation has been extensively
discussed in other works, for example Ref. [7] and refer-
ences therein. Finally, this work focuses on assessing the
security against collective attacks. More work is needed
to extend this approach to general, coherent attacks. Fol-
lowing the results of Ref. [8], we may expect that exten-
sion to coherent attacks comes with significant overheads.
The paper develops as follows. Section II reviews the
ideal protocol of Ref. [10]. Section III discusses in de-
tail the two main discrepancies between ideal CV QKD
and its experimental realizations. Section IV presents a
particular realization of CV QKD protocol, of which I
present a security analysis. Section V reviews the main
theoretical tools utilized. Section VI presents the secu-
rity analysis. Section VII briefly discusses a potential
extension to coherent attacks. Examples are discussed in
Section VIII. A summary of the results is given in Section
IX. Section X is for conclusions.
2II. DESCRIPTION OF THE IDEAL PROTOCOL
This section reviews the main steps of the CV QKD
protocol as it would be implemented ideally, i.e., using
ideal experimental devices. I will do this with the help of
the familiar fictional characters Alice (the authenticated
sender of quantum signals), Bob (the authenticated re-
ceiver), and Eve (the eavesdropper). The ideal protocol
is essentially the one first proposed by Weedbrook et al.
in Ref. [10]:
1. Quantum state preparation. The sender Alice sam-
ples random numbers qA, pA from a Gaussian dis-
tribution with zero mean and variance N . Alice
then prepares a coherent state |α〉 with amplitude
α = (qA + ipA)/
√
2. Physically, N represents the
mean photon number in the input states.
The ensemble of input coherent states prepared by
Alice on system A is represented by a bipartite
state,
σ0XA =
∫
d2αP 0(α)|uα〉〈uα| ⊗ |α〉〈α| , (1)
where
P 0(α) =
1
πN
e−|α|
2/N , (2)
d2α = 12dqAdpA, and |uα〉 is a dummy quantum
state that carries the value of α. The latter is rep-
resented as the random variable X .
2. Quantum communication. Alice sends the coherent
state to Bob through an untrusted quantum com-
munication channel that may be controlled by Eve.
The action of the quantum channel on system A
is described as an isometry transformation UA→BE
that broadcasts quantum information to Bob (B)
and Eve (E). This is represented by the tripartite
state,
σ0XBE =
∫
d2αP 0(α)|uα〉〈uα| ⊗ ψ0BE(α) , (3)
where |ψ0BE(α)〉 = UA→BE |α〉 is the joint state of
Bob and Eve for given α, and ψ0BE(α) is a short
hand notation for |ψ0BE(α)〉〈ψ0BE(α)|.
3. Measurement. Bob measures the received signal
by ideal heterodyne detection. The measurement
outcome is a pair of real numbers, denoted as qB,
pB, that can be represented as a complex number
β = (qB + ipB)/
√
2.
The correlations between α, β an Eve’s quantum
side information are described by the state
σ0XY E =∫
d2αd2βP 0(α, β)|uα〉〈uα| ⊗ |vβ〉〈vβ | ⊗ ψ0E(α, β) , (4)
where |vβ〉 is a dummy quantum state that carries
the value of β, which is represented by the random
variable Y , ψ0E(α, β) is Eve’s state conditioned on
α and β, and P 0(α, β) = P 0(α)P 0(β|α) is the joint
probability.
A symmetrization step could be added to the protocol,
see Ref. [7], to simplify the parameter estimation routine.
For the sake of simplicity I do not consider this step here,
also because a discussion of parameter estimation is out
of the scope of this work.
A quantity of particular interest is the covariance ma-
trix of the quadratures:
γ0jk := 〈QjQk〉P 0 − 〈Qj〉〈Qk〉P 0 , (5)
where Qj, Qk ∈ {qA, pA, qB, pB}, and
〈F (Qj , Qk)〉P 0 :=
∫
d2αd2βP 0(α, β)F (Qj , Qk) , (6)
for any function F .
The above three steps need to be repeated n times.
After that, Alice and Bob post-process their local raw
data to extract a secret shared key of ℓ bits.
Given the physical parameters that characterize the
protocol, including the noise and loss associated with the
communication channel, the value of n is one of the fac-
tors that determine how many secret bits can be gener-
ated. For typical noise and loss values, n could be as
large as 108 − 1012 [7, 11, 13–15]. This strongly depends
on loss, noise, and on the required standard of security.
The classical post-processing includes the routines of
parameter estimation, error reconciliation, and privacy
amplification. Here I assume (without loss of generality)
that Alice reconciles her raw data with Bob (reverse rec-
onciliation). In order to do this efficiently, Alice and Bob
need to apply an Analog to Digital Converter (ADC) to
discretize the variables X and Y . We denote as X¯ and Y¯
the discretized variables, their values will determine the
raw keys of Alice and Bob, respectively.
The ADC is characterized by its range R and number
of output bits. For example, the ADC on Bob’s side is
defined by a set of d non overlapping intervals, with d
equal to the cardinality |Y¯ | of Y¯ ,
Ij = (−R+ (j − 1)δ,−R+ jδ] , (7)
for j = 1, . . . , d− 2, and
I0 = (−∞,−R] , (8)
Id−1 = (−R+ (d− 2)δ,+∞) , (9)
with δ = 2R/(d − 2). To each pair of intervals we asso-
ciate a unique amplitude value βjk = (qBj + ipBk)/
√
2,
where qBj = −R− δ/2 + jδ and pBk = −R− δ/2 + kδ.
Finally, we obtain a description of the state of Bob and
3Eve after the ADC
σ0Y¯ E =∑
jk
|vβjk〉〈vβjk | ⊗
∫
d2α
∫
Ij×Ik
d2βP 0(α, β)ψ0E(α, β) ,
(10)
where Ij × Ik denotes the set of values of β such that
qB ∈ Ij and pB ∈ Ik.
III. DEVIATIONS FROM THE IDEAL
PROTOCOL
This section presents a (not exhaustive) list of the dis-
crepancies between the ideal protocol and its physical
implementations. This will focus on how state prepara-
tion and measurement are modelled in the security proof
of CV QKD.
A. Deviation from ideal quantum state preparation
This accounts for the fact that it is not physically pos-
sible to sample coherent states with a Gaussian distri-
bution of their amplitudes. This is because any physical
device operates within a finite range and resolution.
In any physical realization of the protocol, Alice sam-
ples the coherent state amplitudes from a discrete and
bounded distribution. A known way to assess the secu-
rity of the protocol with discrete amplitude modulation
is to consider the statistical distance between the average
input states of the ideal and practical protocols [11]. In
the ideal protocol, the average state that Alice sends to
Bob is
σ0A =
1
πN
∫
d2α e−
|α|2
N |α〉〈α| . (11)
The state σ0A is in fact a thermal state with N mean
photons.
In practice, Alice draws the coherent state am-
plitudes from some discrete and bounded ensemble,
{p(j), αj}j=1,...,ν , where p(j) is the probability of the
complex amplitude αj . Therefore, the average state sent
to Bob reads:
σA =
ν∑
j=1
p(j)|αj〉〈αj | . (12)
To compare the ideal with the experimental state
preparation step, one considers the trace distance [11]
D(σA, σ
0
A) =
1
2
Tr
∣∣σA − σ0A∣∣ . (13)
Recall that the trace distance quantifies the probability
of successfully discriminating the two states (see, e.g.,
Ref. [16]). A bound on the trace distance of the form
D(σA, σ
0
A) ≤ ǫ(1) implies that any attempt to distinguish
σA from σ
0
A succeeds with probability no larger than ǫ
(1).
Because the protocol requires the preparation of n sig-
nals, we should not consider the quantity in Eq. (13), but
its n-fold version,
D(σ⊗nA , σ
0
A
⊗n
) , (14)
which is defined on n identical copies of σA and σ
0
A. This
is related to the single-copy trace distance through the
inequality
D(σ⊗nA , σ
0
A
⊗n
) ≤ nD(σA, σ0A) . (15)
Therefore, the practical protocol is indistinguishable
from the ideal one up to a probability smaller than
ǫ(n) = nǫ(1). Note that this failure probability grows
linearly with n.
We want the failure probability to be sufficiently small.
For example, some authors put the overall security failure
probability in a range between 10−10 [11, 13, 14] and
10−20 [7]. Putting this together with the fact that n may
be in the range of 108 − 1012, we obtain that ǫ(1) needs
to lay somewhere between 10−18 and 10−32.
Obviously, achieving this target would require a level
of experimental control that is hardly seen in laboratory
practice. This shows that, despite recent mathematical
results, the question still remains open: How CV QKD
can be made provably secure in practical experimental re-
alizations?
B. Deviation from ideal heterodyne detection
This accounts for the fact that any physical device that
implements Bob’s measurement has finite range, whereas
the output of ideal heterodyne detection is unbounded.
This is a most important issue because it affects the
cornerstone of the security proofs for CV QKD protocol,
i.e., the optimality of Gaussian attacks [17, 18]. This
important result, which will be reviewed in the Section
V, only holds for ideal heterodyne detection. In fact,
the property of optimality of Gaussian attacks follows
from the symmetry of ideal heterodyne detection. This
symmetry is broken when ideal heterodyne is replaced
with non-ideal heterodyne having a finite range.
It is not clear how it could be extended or adapted to
finite-range non-ideal heterodyne.
In other words, the celebrated extremality of Gaussian
attacks holds under the assumption of ideal homodyne
or heterodyne detection. In reality, the experimental re-
alization of these detection techniques is imperfect, as
they have a bounded range. The conclusions then is that,
strictly speaking, the property of extremality of Gaussian
attacks cannot be applied to any physical realization of
CV QKD.
4IV. DESCRIPTION OF A PRACTICAL
PROTOCOL
We consider a specific experimental scheme for quan-
tum state preparation, where Alice prepares coherent
states drawn from a finite set. See Table I for a sum-
mary of the notation used.
Consider a set of d non-overlapping intervals:
Jj = (−RA + jδA,−RA + (j + 1)δA] , (16)
for j = 0, . . . , d − 1, with δA = 2RA/d. To each pair
of these intervals we associate a unique complex number
αjk = (qAj + ipAk)/
√
2, where qAj = −RA + jδA + δA/2
and pAk = −RA + kδA + δA/2.
The state preparation routine is then defined as fol-
lows. First Alice draws a complex value α = (qA +
ipA)/
√
2 from a (sub-normalized) probability distribu-
tion P (α) on the domain RA = [−RA, RA]× [−RA, RA],
i.e., P (α) is non-zero only if qA ∈ [−RA, RA] and pA ∈
[−RA, RA]. Then, she prepares the coherent state |αjk〉
if qA ∈ Jj and pA ∈ Jk.
The ensemble prepared in this way is described by the
bipartite state
σXA =
d−1∑
j,k=0
∫
Jj×Jk
d2αP (α)|uα〉〈uα| ⊗ |αjk〉〈αjk | .
(17)
We shall compare this with its counterpart σ0XA for the
ideal protocol in Eq. (1), using for example, the trace
distance
ǫp := D(σXA, σ
0
XA) . (18)
We also define the states σXBE and σXYE for the prac-
tical protocol in the same way as we have done for the
ideal protocol. We have
σXBE =
d−1∑
j,k=0
∫
Jj×Jk
d2αP (α)|uα〉〈uα| ⊗ ψBE(αjk) ,
(19)
and
σXYE =
d−1∑
j,k=0
∫
Jj×Jk
d2α
∫
d2βP (α, β)
|uα〉〈uα| ⊗ |vβ〉〈vβ | ⊗ ψE(αjk, β) ,
(20)
where P (α, β) is the joint probability of Alice and Bob.
It follows from the monotonicity of the trace distance
under completely positive maps that
D(σXBE , σ
0
XBE) ≤ ǫp , (21)
D(σXY E , σ
0
XY E) ≤ ǫp , (22)
and
D(σXY , σ
0
XY ) =
1
2
∫
d2αd2β
∣∣P (α, β)− P 0(α, β)∣∣ ≤ ǫp .
(23)
This latter bound will be useful for the estimation of the
cross-diagonal terms of the covariance matrix in Section
VIB.
We define the covariance matrix for the practical pro-
tocol,
γjk := 〈QjQk〉P − 〈Qj〉〈Qk〉P , (24)
with
〈F (Qj , Qk)〉P =
∫
d2αd2βP (α, β)F (Qj , Qk) . (25)
Comparing this with the covariance matrix γ0 in Eq. (5),
note that this is defined using the probability distribution
P instead of P 0.
Finally, consider the distance between the average
states sent to Bob in the ideal and practical protocols,
ǫa := D(σA, σ
0
A) , (26)
where
σA =
d−1∑
j,k=0
∫
Jj×Jk
d2αP (α)|αjk〉〈αjk| , (27)
σ0A =
∫
d2αP 0(α)|α〉〈α| . (28)
Note that in general ǫa, defined in Eq. (26), is smaller
than ǫp, defined in Eq. (18). In Section VIII we will see
that in some cases ǫa can be several orders of magnitude
smaller than ǫp.
It follows from the monotonicity property of the trace
distance that ǫa bounds the distance between the joint
state of Bob and Eve, even after Bob’s measurement and
the application of the ADC, i.e.,
D(σY E , σ
0
Y E) ≤ ǫa , (29)
D(σY¯ E , σ
0
Y¯ E) ≤ ǫa , (30)
as well as
D(σY , σ
0
Y ) =
1
2
∫
d2β|P (β)− P 0(β)| ≤ ǫa , (31)
and D(σY¯ , σ
0
Y¯
) ≤ ǫa. We will use the latter bounds to
estimate the key rate in Section VIA and the diagonal
term in the covariance matrix in Section VIB.
5Symbol Meaning
RA Range of Alice’s state preparation
δA Bin size for Alice’s state preparation
M Range of Bob’s heterodyne measurement
RB Range of Bob’s ADC
δB Bin size for Bob’s ADC
log d, b Bits per quadrature for Alice and Bob’s raw key
X Alice’s continuous variable
X¯ Alice’s discrete variable
Y Bob’s continuous variable
Y¯ Bob’s discrete variable
N Mean photon number in signals sent from Alice
n Number of elementary transmissions (i.e. block size)
TABLE I: List of symbols used to characterize the protocol.
V. MAIN THEORETICAL TOOLS APPLIED IN
THIS WORK
Here I review the main theoretical tools applied for the
security analysis presented in Section VI. The reader who
is already familiar with these tools can skip this Section.
The leftover hash lemma establishes a link between the
min-entropy of a random variable Y¯ and the amount of
uniform randomness that can be extracted from it [19].
Consider the bipartite state,
ρY¯ E =
∑
y
pY¯ (y)|y〉〈y| ⊗ ρE(y) , (32)
that describes the correlations between a classical ran-
dom variable Y¯ and a quantum system E. The latter may
represent the quantum system under the control of the
eavesdropper Eve. Here pY¯ (y) is the probability that Y¯
takes value equal to y, and {|y〉} is a collection of orthog-
onal unit vectors that carry the values of Y¯ . The min-
entropy of Y¯ conditioned on E, denoted as Hmin(Y¯ |E),
quantifies the probability of guessing the value of Y¯ from
measuring the system E. In fact, the optimal probability
of guessing is pguess = 2
−Hmin(Y¯ |E).
According to the direct part of the leftover hash
lemma, it is possible to extract from Y¯ a string of ℓǫh+ǫs
random bits that are uniform and secret to Eve, up to a
failure probability smaller than ǫh + ǫs, where [20, 21]
ℓǫh+ǫs ≥ Hǫsmin(Y¯ |E)− 2 log (1/ǫh) + 1 . (33)
This bound is expressed in terms of the smooth min-
entropy, Hǫsmin(Y¯ |E), which is computed on a state ρǫsY¯ E
that is ǫs-close to ρY¯ E [21, 22].
The Asymptotic Equipartition Property (AEP) allows
us to estimate the smooth min-entropy in terms of the
Shannon entropy. In fact, these two quantities coincides
in the thermodynamic limit. For a n-fold tensor power
of the state in Eq. (32), the following bound holds [21]
Hǫsmin(Y¯
n|En) ≥ nH(Y¯ |E)−√n∆(ǫs, |Y¯ |) , (34)
where ∆(ǫs, |Y¯ |) is a function of the smoothing parameter
ǫs and of the cardinality |Y¯ | of the random variable Y¯ ,
with [16]
∆(ǫs, |Y¯ |) ≤ 4
(
1
2
log |Y¯ |+ 1
)√
log
2
ǫ2s
. (35)
Note that this expression for the finite-size correction in
the AEP, obtained in Ref. [16], is an improved version of
the one of Ref. [7]. See Ref. [16] for more details.
To be precise, the state relevant to QKD applications is
not necessarily a n-fold tensor power. This is due to the
fact that a secret key is extracted only when Alice and
Bob succeed in performing the error correction routine.
Since error correction succeeds with non-unit probability,
their joint state, conditioned on successful error correc-
tion, is no longer a tensor power [7]. Nevertheless, there
are ways to circumvent this issue and still apply the AEP.
A first approach to account for this issue was presented
in Ref. [7]. A second approach was discussed in Ref. [16].
According to Ref. [16], we can account for the finite suc-
cess probability of error correction simply by replacing
∆(ǫs, |Y¯ |) with ∆
(
τpǫs, |Y¯ |
)
, where p is the probability
of successful error correction and τ is a (small) constant.
A feasible value is τ = 23 [16]. Furthermore, an additive
correction log (p− τpǫs) has to be introduced. This cor-
rections are not considered here to keep the formulas as
simple as possible. Including these corrections does not
substantially change the results presented here.
Continuity of the quantum mutual information. Sev-
eral inequalities exist that bound the value of quantum
entropies in the neighbour of a given quantum states, see
e.g. Refs. [23–26]. Here we apply an inequality for the
quantum mutual information as presented in Ref. [26].
Consider a pair of bipartite states, ρY¯ E , ρ
0
Y¯ E
, on quan-
tum systems Y¯ and E. If D(ρY¯ E , ρ
0
Y¯ E
) ≤ ǫ, then the
following inequality holds:∣∣I(Y¯ ;E)ρ − I(Y¯ ;E)ρ0 ∣∣ ≤ f(ǫ, |Y¯ |) , (36)
where I(Y¯ ;E) denotes the quantum mutual information,
and [26]
f(ǫ, |Y¯ |) := ǫ log |Y¯ |+ 2(1 + ǫ) log (1 + ǫ)− 2ǫ log ǫ .
(37)
Note that this bound is independent of the dimension of
E, which may be infinite.
The optimality of Gaussian attacks is a property of pro-
tocols where Alice prepares coherent states with a Gaus-
sian amplitude distribution, and Bob measures by ideal
homodyne or heterodyne detection. It establishes that,
for given covariance matrix of Alice and Bob’s quadra-
tures, the optimal attack for Eve is a Gaussian attack.
This is summarized by the inequality
I(Y ;E)σ0 ≤ I(Y ;E)σG , (38)
where σG is a Gaussian state having the same covariance
matrix as σ0, and Y denotes the random variable associ-
ated with the outcome of ideal heterodyne measurement.
6Symbol Meaning
ǫh Hashing error
ǫs Entropy smoothing parameter
ǫp Symbol by symbol preparation error, Eq. (18)
ǫa Average preparation error, Eq. (26)
ǫRA,N
√
N
2pi
e−
R2A
2N
TABLE II: List of symbols used in the security analysis.
The important point that I want to emphasize here is
that the theorem holds for the ideal protocol where Alice
prepares a Gaussian distribution of coherent states and
Bob applies ideal heterodyne. See Refs. [17, 18, 27] for
more detail.
VI. A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO ASSESS
THE SECURITY OF CV QKD
In this Section, I outline an approach to assess the secu-
rity of the protocol described in Section II, assuming the
particular practical implementation of Section IV. The
following subsections focus on imperfect state prepara-
tion and non-ideal heterodyne detection.
The security analysis is developed within the frame-
work of composable security [28]. Therefore, the protocol
is shown to be secure up to a small probability of error
ǫ = ǫh + ǫs + ǫa. The contributions to this and other
errors parameters are summarized in Table II.
A. The issue with discrete input modulation
For n signal transmissions we are interested in finding
a lower bound on the conditional smooth min-entropy
Hǫsmin(Y¯
n|En)σ⊗n , (39)
where Y¯ n denotes n instances of the Bob’s discretized
heterodyne output. The min-entropy can then be used
to bound the secret key rate through the leftover hash
lemma, see Section V. As we assume collective attacks,
the joint state of Bob and Eve is a tensor product, σ⊗n.
By applying the AEP we obtain, see Eq. (34),
1
n
Hǫsmin(Y¯
n|En)σ⊗n ≥ H(Y¯ |E)σ − 1√
n
∆(ǫs, |Y¯ |) (40)
= H(Y¯ )σ − I(Y¯ ;E)σ − 1√
n
∆(ǫs, |Y¯ |) , (41)
where the second equality follows from the identity
H(Y¯ |E)σ = H(Y¯ )σ − I(Y¯ ;E)σ. Note that, from the
measurement data, Bob can empirically estimate the en-
tropy H(Y¯ ), see Ref. [7].
We now relate the mutual information I(Y¯ ;E)σ, which
refers to the practical protocol, to the mutual informa-
tion I(Y¯ ;E)σ0 , that would be obtained with the ideal
protocol. Using the condition in Eq. (30) and the conti-
nuity bound on the mutual information in Eq. (36), we
obtain
I(Y¯ ;E)σ ≤ I(Y¯ ;E)σ0 + f(ǫa, |Y¯ |) . (42)
Putting this in Eq. (41) we finally obtain
1
n
Hǫsmin(Y¯
n|En)σ⊗n ≥ H(Y¯ )σ − I(Y¯ ;E)σ0
−f(ǫa, |Y¯ |)− 1√
n
∆(ǫs, |Y¯ |) .
(43)
A similar bound has been obtained Kaur et al. [12].
However, the bound of Ref. [12] depends on a free pa-
rameter that cannot be estimated experimentally.
B. The issue with non-ideal heterodyne detection
and the optimality of Gaussian attacks
The next step is to relate the discrete and bounded
variable Y¯ with the continuous and unbounded variable
Y that would be obtained with ideal heterodyne detec-
tion. Note that the ADC transformation, Y → Y¯ , defines
a completely positive and trace-preserving map, therefore
we can apply the monotonicity property of the quantum
mutual information to obtain
I(Y¯ ;E)σ0 ≤ I(Y ;E)σ0 . (44)
Putting this in Eq. (43) we obtain
1
n
Hǫsmin(Y¯
n|En)σ⊗n ≥ H(Y¯ )σ − I(Y ;E)σ0
−f(ǫa, |Y¯ |)− 1√
n
∆(ǫs, |Y¯ |) .
(45)
We can now apply the property of optimality of Gaus-
sian attacks. In fact, the mutual information I(Y ;E)σ0
is defined for the variable Y that is the output of ideal
heterodyne detection, and is computed on the state σ0
that is generated for the ideal state preparation. We can
then insert Eq. (38) into (45) and obtain
1
n
Hǫsmin(Y¯
n|En)σ⊗n ≥ H(Y¯ )σ − I(Y ;E)σG
−f(ǫa, |Y¯ |)− 1√
n
∆(ǫs, |Y¯ |) ,
(46)
where σG is a Gaussian state that has the same covari-
ance matrix as σ0.
Unlike I(Y ;E)σ0 , the Gaussian mutual information
I(Y ;E)σG is uniquely determined by the covariance ma-
trix of σ0, i.e., the quantity defined in Eq. (5). The prob-
lem is that the state σ0 is neither prepared nor measured
7in the laboratory. The only state that is physically acces-
sible is σ. So we are in the position of having to estimate
the covariance matrix of σ0 from measuring σ.
The fact that these two states are close in trace dis-
tance is, in general, not sufficient to bound the difference
between their covariance matrices, see Ref. [12]. This
is essentially due to the fact that the variable Y is un-
bounded. Kaur et al. addressed this problem by introduc-
ing two parameters, called c1 and c2, that quantify the
distance between the state σ and σ0. Although the final
result only mildly depends on these parameters, there is
no known way to determine c1 and c2.
Here I do not solve this problem, but propose a prac-
tical workaround that takes into account the data that
is actually collected in the laboratory. My approach is
not mathematically rigorous, but it is physically moti-
vated. It is based on the observation that the range of
any experimental realization of heterodyne is limited by
saturation and non-linear effects. This means that Bob
can only measure values of the quadratures qB, pB within
a finite rangeM = [−M,M ]× [−M,M ]. As a matter of
fact, this is what is necessarily done in any experimental
realization of CV QKD.
From the physical point of view, Eqs. (45)-(46) are
not very informative, as they are written in terms of the
covariance matrix of ideal heterodyne, which cannot be
estimated experimentally. Therefore, I will address the
physically well-defined question: What would be the co-
variance matrix of non-ideal heterodyne on the state σ0?
It is then possible to compare the covariance matrix of
non-ideal heterodyne detection on the states σ and σ0.
Consider for example the quadrature qB and compare
the mean values 〈q2B〉P and 〈q2B〉P 0 , which refer to σ and
σ0, respectively. We have
∣∣〈q2B〉P − 〈q2B〉P 0 ∣∣ ≤
∫
M
∣∣P (β)− P 0(β)∣∣ q2Bd2β (47)
≤M2
∫
M
∣∣P (β)− P 0(β)∣∣ d2β (48)
≤ 2ǫaM2 , (49)
where the second inequality follows from the fact that
qB ∈ [−M,M ], and the last inequality follows form Eq.
(31). The same bound can be obtained for the quadrature
pB.
Consider now the cross-diagonal terms, for example
〈qAqB〉P and 〈qAqB〉P 0 . We have:
|〈qAqB〉P − 〈qAqB〉P 0 |
≤
∫
d2α
∫
M
d2β
∣∣P (α, β)− P 0(α, β)∣∣ |qAqB |
(50)
≤M
∫
d2α
∫
M
d2β
∣∣P (α, β) − P 0(α, β)∣∣ |qA|
(51)
≤ RAM
∫
qA≤RA
d2α
∫
d2β
∣∣P (α, β)− P 0(α, β)∣∣
+M
∫
qA>RA
d2α
∫
d2βP 0(α, β) |qA| (52)
≤ 2RAMǫp +M ǫRA,N , (53)
where inequality (52) follows from the fact that P (α, β) =
0 if |qA| > RA, and the last inequality follows from Eq.
(23). Furthermore, in the last inequality we have intro-
duced the notation
ǫRA,N :=
∫
qA>RA
d2α
∫
d2βP 0(α, β) |qA| (54)
=
∫
qA>RA
d2αP 0(α) |qA| (55)
=
√
N
2π
e−
R2
A
2N , (56)
which builds on Eq. (2). In a similar way we can bound
all the other cross-diagonal terms, 〈qApB〉P 0 , 〈pAqB〉P 0 ,
and 〈pApB〉P 0 .
Note that the signal-by-signal preparation error ǫp ap-
pears in the estimate of the cross-diagonal terms, whereas
the correction in the diagonal terms only depends on the
average preparation error ǫa.
VII. EXTENSION TO COHERENT ATTACKS
To establish the security against most general coher-
ent attacks is the final goal of the security analysis of
any QKD protocols. Due to the complexity of the prob-
lem, the security proofs are typically built step after step.
First focusing on collective attacks, and then seeking an
extension to coherent attacks. For the case of CV QKD
protocols with discrete input modulation, asymptotic se-
curity proofs were obtained in 2019 in Refs. [29, 30], and
still it is not known how these results can be extended to
include finite-size effects and coherent attacks.
Here I have presented an approach that is independent
and complementary to those of Refs. [29, 30], focusing
on collective attacks in the non-asymptotic regime. An
extension to coherent attacks is still premature at this
stage because, as discussed above, this approach is not
yet able to provide a full and rigorous security proof for
collective attacks.
8The post-selection technique has been applied success-
fully to extend the security of QKD protocols from collec-
tive to coherent attacks [31]. This technique exploits the
symmetries of the protocol. Typically, CV QKD proto-
cols are symmetric under permutation of the signal trans-
missions [32], and under multi-mode unitary transforma-
tions that mix many signal transmissions [8, 33]. Discrete
modulation breaks the symmetry under unitary transfor-
mations, therefore, if the post-selection technique is to be
applied, one should consider other symmetries. Another
ingredient of known security proof against coherent at-
tacks is an energy test that is used the effective dimension
of the system. In principle, the energy test does not de-
pend on the symmetry of the protocol, and therefore can
be applied to discrete-modulation CV QKD protocols.
VIII. EXAMPLES
Consider an example where Alice samples the coherent
state amplitudes from a regular square lattice of size 2n,
i.e., encoding n bits per quadrature. This encoding covers
a region in phase space of length 2RA. Following the
general procedure described in Section IV, this region is
divided in intervals Jj × Jk, with
Jj = (−RA + jδA,−RA + (j + 1)δA] , (57)
for j = 0, . . . , 2n−1, with δA = 2RA/2n. To each interval
is associated a unique complex number αjk = (qAj +
ipAk)/
√
2, where qAj = −RA + jδA + δA/2 and pAk =
−RA + kδA + δA/2.
To provide a visual intuition to the reader, Fig. 1 shows
the grid of coherent states generated in this way, for b = 6
(i.e., 6 bits per quadrature), and RA = 6
√
N (i.e., the
range covers 6 standard deviations), and the mean pho-
ton number is N = 3. (These values for the parameters
are in the same range as the parameters used in Refs.
[11, 34].)
The amplitudes are sampled from the probability dis-
tribution [11]
P (α) = NχJj×Jke−|αjk|
2/N , (58)
where χJj×Jk is the characteristic function of Jj×Jk, and
N is a normalisation factor. The average preparation
error can be estimated numerically. Following the recipe
of Ref. [11], and using the values of b, RA, and N given
above, we obtain ǫa ≤ 10−6.
The error parameter ǫa is relevant to estimate the se-
cret key rate through the quantum mutual information.
Putting Eq. (46) into (33) we obtain the following esti-
mate of the secret key rate:
rǫh+ǫsn = H(Y¯ )σ − I(Y ;E)σG − leakEC
−f(ǫa, |Y¯ |)− 1√
n
∆(ǫs, |Y¯ |) ,
(59)
where leakEC is the number of bits leaked for error recon-
ciliation, and we have neglected the terms− 2n log (1/ǫh)+
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FIG. 1: A grid of coherent state amplitudes in phase space.
The parameters are: b = 6 (i.e., 6 bits per quadrature), RA =
6
√
N (i.e., the range covers 6 standard deviations), and the
mean photon number is N = 3. The blue circle has radius
equal to the standard deviation
√
N . The average preparation
error is ǫa ≤ 10−6. The value N = 3 is similar to the value
used, for example, in Ref. [34]), and the values of b = 6 bits
per quadrature and of 6 standard deviations are similar to the
values used in Ref. [11].
1
n , as this is of higher order in n. The correction term
f(ǫa, |Y¯ |) is plotted in Fig. 2, showing that it grows lin-
early with ǫa.
For the sake of comparison, we put
H(Y¯ )σ − leakEC ≡ βI(X ;Y )σG , (60)
where β < 1 is the error correction efficiency, and
I(X ;Y )σG is the mutual information between Alice and
Bob for an ideal protocol with Gaussian modulation and
under Gaussian attack. We further assume an entan-
gling cloner attack with loss factor η and excess noise
u = (1− η)ω. This is equivalent to say that the channel
from Alice to Bob is a thermal loss channel. Table III
summarizes the parameters that characterize this chan-
nel model. This yields the asymptotic key rate
r∞ = βI(X ;Y )σG − I(Y ;E)σG (61)
= β log
[
1 +
ηN
(1− η)ω + 1
]
− g[N ] + g[(1− η)N˜ ] ,
(62)
where g[x] := (x+ 1) log (x+ 1)− x log x, and
N˜ =
N(1 + ω)
1 + ηN + (1− η)ω . (63)
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FIG. 2: This shows the additive error f(ǫa, |Y¯ |) in the key
rate (see Eq. (59)) versus the average preparation error ǫa (see
Eq. (26)). The plot is obtained for |Y¯ | = 212, i.e., 6 bits per
quadrature. Note that f(ǫa, |Y¯ |) grows only logarithmically
with |Y¯ |.
Figure 3 (solid line) shows the key rate versus the block
size n,
rǫh+ǫsn = r∞ − f(ǫa, |Y¯ |)−
1√
n
∆(ǫs, |Y¯ |) , (64)
and compares it with the asymptotic rate r∞ (dot-dashed
line). The figure is obtained for ǫs = 10
−10, ǫa = 10−6,
and |Y¯ | = 212 (6 bits per quadrature). With this choice
of parameters we have f(ǫa, |Y¯ |)≪ 1√n ∆(ǫs, |Y¯ |).
Let us now look at the estimation of the covariance ma-
trix. Figure 3 has been obtained assuming given values
of the channel parameters: loss and excess noise. These
parameters are in turn estimated from the covariance ma-
trix of the quadratures. However, the discussion in Sec-
tion VIB showed that there could be a difference between
the covariance matrix of the ideal and real protocol, the
difference between the entries of the covariance matrix
being bounded as in Eq. (49) for the diagonal terms, and
Eq. (53) for the off-diagonal ones.
The error in the diagonal terms is determined by the
parameter ǫa. With a preparation routine based on 6 bits
per quadrature, 6 standard deviation, and mean photon
number N = 3, we obtain ǫa ≤ 10−6. Assuming a range
for Bob’s heterodyne of 6 standard deviations, i.e.,
M ≃ 6
√
ηN + u , (65)
the error in the diagonal terms is
2ǫaM
2 ≃ 72× 10−6(ηN + u) < 10−4(ηN + u) . (66)
Given that the expected value of the diagonal terms of
the covariance matrix is ηN + u, this yields a relative
error smaller than 10−4.
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FIG. 3: The plot shows the key rate in bits per channel use, for
loss η = 0.1 and excess noise u = 10−4. The dot-dashed line
shows the ideal, asymptotic rate r∞ in Eq. (62). The solid line
shows the non-ideal, non-asymptotic estimate for the secret
key in Eq. (64), with ǫs = 10
−10, ǫa = 10
−6, and |Y¯ | = 212
(b = 6 bits per quadrature). The symbol-by-symbol error
parameter ǫp is virtually put equal to 0. The main correction
term in the solid line is due to the term 1√
n
∆(ǫs, |Y¯ |). The
dashed lines are obtained by also including the additive error
in the estimation of the covariance matrix. From bottom to
top, with b = 11 and b = 14 bits per quadrature. Note that
more bits per quadrature are needed to have a non-zero key
rate because the additive error is dominated by the symbol-
by-symbol error ǫp.
The error in the off-diagonal terms of the covariance
matrix is instead determined by ǫp. This is problematic
because the latter can be much larger than ǫa. In fact,
combining Eq. (1) and Eq. (17) into Eq. (18), we obtain
ǫp =
1
2
d−1∑
j,k=0
∫
Jj×Jk
d2α‖P (α)|αjk〉〈αjk| − P 0(α)|α〉〈α|‖
(67)
≃ 1
2
d−1∑
j,k=0
∫
Jj×Jk
d2αP 0(α)‖|αjk〉〈αjk| − |α〉〈α|‖
(68)
=
d−1∑
j,k=0
∫
Jj×Jk
d2αP 0(α)
√
1− e−|α−αjk|2 (69)
≃
d−1∑
j,k=0
∫
Jj×Jk
d2αP 0(α)|α − αjk| . (70)
The first approximation comes from the fact that P (α) ≃
P 0(α), the second equality follows from the expression
of the trace distance between coherent states, and the
last approximation is a first order Taylor expansion in
|α− αjk|.
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Note that
|α− αjk| = 1√
2
√
(qA − qAj)2 + (pA − pAj)2 . (71)
Therefore, given a preparation routine with range RA
and b bits per quadrature, then δA =
2RA
2b
is the bin size,
which yields
qA − qAj ≃
δA
2
, (72)
pA − pAj ≃
δA
2
, (73)
and thus
|α− αjk| ≃ δA
2
. (74)
In conclusions we obtain the following estimate for ǫp,
ǫp ≃ δA
2
. (75)
This shows that the signal-by-signal preparation error
ǫp is determined by Alice’s bin size only. For example,
using b = 6 bits per quadrature, 6 standard deviation,
and mean photon number N = 3, we obtain
δA = 2× 6
√
N/26 ≃ 0.32 , (76)
and ǫp ≃ 0.16, which is about 5 orders of magnitude
larger than ǫa!
A relatively large value of ǫp has a negative impact on
the estimation of the off-diagonal terms in the covariance
matrix. From Eq. (53), putting RA = 6
√
N and M =
6
√
ηN + u ≃ 6√ηN , we obtain an error of the order of
2RAMǫp +MǫRA,N ≃ 72
√
ηNǫp + 6
√
ηN
e−18√
2π
(77)
≃ (72ǫp + 10−8)√ηN . (78)
Therefore, to make this error term sufficiently small, we
need ǫp to be much smaller than 1/72 ≃ 0.014. In turn,
with RA = 6
√
N andN = 3, to obtain ǫp = 1/72 we need
to put b > 11, i.e., use at least 11 bits per quadrature.
Figure 3 (dashed lines) shows the key rate obtained by
taking into account the additive errors to the covariance
matrix. The two dashed lines in Fig. 3 are obtained for
b = 11 and b = 14, i.e., 11 and 14 bits per quadrature.
The figure shows how the key rate drops if b is not large
enough.
IX. SUMMARY OF RESULTS
Here I have considered two main discrepancies between
the experimental implementations of CV QKD and the
mathematical models used to prove its security. They
account for imperfections in state preparation and mea-
surements. In summary:
Symbol Meaning
η Loss factor
u Excess noise, u = (1− η)ω.
ω Eve’s mean photons in the entangled cloner attack.
TABLE III: List of symbols used to characterize the channel
parameters.
1. To deal with imperfect state preparation, I have
exploited the continuity of the quantum mutual in-
formation. Given an imperfect state preparation
routine with average preparation error ǫa, the key
rate differs from that of the ideal protocol by an
additive term given in Eq. (37),
f(ǫa, |Y¯ |) = ǫa log |Y¯ |
+ 2(1 + ǫa) log (1 + ǫa)− 2ǫa log ǫa , (79)
see Eq. (43), where, in reverse reconciliation, |Y¯ | is
the cardinality of Bob’s raw key.
A similar bound, previously proposed in Ref. [12],
was expressed in term of a function f˜(ǫa, PE). Note
that the latter depends on the parameter PE , which
quantifies the mean photon number of the eaves-
dropper. Unfortunately, there is no known way for
Alice and Bob to estimate PE .
2. Using the continuity of the quantum mutual infor-
mation requires to estimate the covariance matrix
of a state that is not physically accessible. I have in
part resolved this ambiguity by invoking a physical
argument based on the fact any experimental re-
alization of heterodyne detection has necessarily a
finite range. This has allowed me to bound the co-
variance matrix of the unphysical state with that of
a physically accessible one. This approach should
be considered as a practical workaround and has no
ambitious of mathematical rigour.
For the diagonal terms of the covariance matrix,
for example 〈q2B〉, this bound has the form, see Eq.
(49),
〈q2B〉unphys ≤ 〈q2B〉phys + 2M2ǫa . (80)
For the off-diagonal terms, for example 〈qAqB〉, we
obtain, see Eq. (53),
〈qAqB〉unphys ≥
〈qAqB〉phys − 2RAMǫp −M
√
N
2π
e−
R2
A
2N . (81)
For the meaning of the parameters M , RA, N ,
please refer to Table I.
3. The analysis of the physical implementations of the
CV QKD protocol has been developed in terms of
two preparation errors, ǫa and ǫp, both defined as
a trace distances:
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• ǫa, defined in Eq. (26), is the average error
in the state preparation. This quantity was
also considered in other works, most notably
in Ref. [11];
• ǫp, defined in Eq. (18), is a symbol-by-symbol
error. This can be orders of magnitude larger
than ǫa.
The analysis presented here shows that ǫp, and not
ǫa, is the relevant parameter for the estimation of
the off-diagonal elements of the covariance matrix.
To the best of my knowledge, this fact was not no-
ticed in previous literature.
X. CONCLUSIONS
This work has explored the gap between theoretical
security proofs and experimental implementations of CV
QKD. Unlike other works, I have made use of both math-
ematical tools and physical arguments to assess the se-
curity of a practical CV QKD protocol. The result is a
security analysis that is as rigorous as it can be, given
the theoretical tools we have in our toolbox and the lim-
itations of experimental practice. This approach indeed
mirrors what is done in practice in laboratory realizations
of CV QKD. I have focused on the one-way protocol of
Ref. [10], but similar conclusions can be drawn for two-
way [9, 35] and Measurement-Device-Independent proto-
cols [36, 37].
I have discussed some of the discrepancies between
mathematical models and experimental realizations of
CV QKD. On one hand, we have elegant mathematical
theorems that exploit symmetries in infinite-dimensional
Hilbert spaces, see e.g. Refs. [7, 8, 17, 38]. On the other
hand, physicists and engineers deal with imperfect and
noisy devices and operate with limited resources.
In principle, one expects the mathematical models to
be meaningful approximations of physical reality, whose
scope is to guide the experimental work. In CV QKD, I
see the risk that the experimenter might be faced with
the overwhelming task of having to reproduce the math-
ematical models with unrealistic levels of confidence. If
this is the case, the models may lose their usefulness to
physics. This work represents an attempts to highlight
and mitigate this risk.
In conclusions, this work has outlined an
experimentally-friendly approach to assess the se-
curity of CV QKD. More effort is necessary to develop
this into a full security proof (for example, I have not
discussed here the routine of parameter estimation,
which, however, has been studied extensively in other
works, see, e.g. [7, 39, 40]). This contribution goes in
the same direction of other recent works that have dis-
cussed protocols and security proofs that, by definition,
require a finite constellation of input coherent states
[12, 29, 30, 41–43].
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